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1. Introduction 
Since its inception, cognitive poetics has applied the empirical findings of the cognitive 
sciences to the process of reading literature. To do this, practitioners have developed a 
number of highly developed methods. In fact, these “methods,” although systematic, are 
numerous and hard to categorize. Often, one aspect of cognitive processes is applied to 
the reading of literature to understand a particular psychological effect of text. These 
basic processes often include cognitive script- and schema-development, figure-ground 
relationships, linguistic iconicity, and metaphor, to name a few areas of methodological 
interest. More elaborate systematic methods involving a number of cognitive processes 
and procedures also exist. These include systems of narrative analysis, the interpretation 
of irony, and the construction of rich fictional worlds based upon time and place, to 
name just a few elaborate methodologies. 
One central tenet of cognitive poetics, as practitioners admit, posits an ideal, unified 
reader of literature, which helps keep cognitive poetics focused on literary critical con-
cerns, not social or linguistic concerns (Stockwell Cognitive Poetics 5-6). This ideal reader 
helps researchers typify working knowledge on syntactic through pragmatic and rhetori-
cal phenomena and contexts. However, this unified reader has led to attacks on cognitive 
poetics as simply American New Criticism (i.e. closed text close reading) cloaked in cog-
nitive terminology, or, because cognitive poetics posits a well-trained, unified reader, it 
has also been criticized for being unable to respond to readers informed by unique social 
and cultural experiences. This would include readers not well studied in the interpreta-
tion of literature, and this would also include hermeneutic traditions that have goals oth-
er than literary production, such as religious hermeneutics derived from different textual 
and cultural traditions with purposes based in religious faith or instruction. Max 
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Louwerse and Willie Van Peer summarize this criticism, intimating that this line of ar-
gument suggests 
 
that what readers engage in when they encounter literary texts are processes very much 
tied to individual and social norms and values, to identification […]. Many people would 
argue that under such conditions it is not easy to employ empirical methodology, because 
the processes going on are invisible to the eye, they are subjective in nature, and depend 
upon value orientations. We do not deny such characteristic of these phenomena, but we 
do disagree that they in any way prohibit the use of empirical methods. (423-24) 
 
Despite these attacks on cognitive poetics, it remains a formidable tool for the study 
of reading practices in any discourse. Cognitive poetics has grown beyond its original 
application to literature; the use of cognitive poetic methodologies on the reading pro-
cess for advertising, informational, and mixed media discourses is now quite common.  
This article will use one particular method of cognitive poetics, text world theory, to 
suggest that cognitive poetics can, indeed, be used to evaluate a variety of social or cul-
tural discourse. This article will examine how religious discourse constructs worlds dif-
ferently than public discourses, which I will define as secular, political, and persuasive-
activist in nature.  
Moreover, this article seeks to model how these differences in text world construction 
are informed by cognitive schematic knowledge unique to religious hermeneutic tradi-
tions. To provide a narrowed study of religious and non-religious discourses, this article 
will evaluate three examples of anaphora: a 1980’s Neil Kinnock anti-Thatcher political 
speech, the New Testament’s Sermon on the Mount, and the public Catholic social activ-
ist rhetoric of Dorothy Day. 
Political rhetoric such as Kinnock’s and public activist rhetoric such as Catholic Day’s 
rhetoric are historically situated forms of rhetoric with proposals for action that are 
mapped onto immediate political urgencies. These two types of discourse, while contain-
ing instructional material that could be mapped onto other situations in the past or pre-
sent, are very specific and highly “built” and contain more specific commands as well as 
objects and events when compared to religious rhetoric that is based not in argument, 
but absolute Truth, such as the Sermon on the Mount. Public (secular, political, persua-
sive, activist) rhetoric’s more specific commands, events, and objects typically apply to 
the more specific and identifiable problems of the immediate historical moment. The ex-
ample of religious discourse examined here, the Sermon on the Mount, however, tends 
to offer a less “built” world in terms of its types and locations when making proposals 
for action. Undoubtedly, this is because the instruction is absolutist in nature and does 
not have a specific destination or expiration. For its community of readers, it can be and 
should be mapped onto all circumstances. This is in opposition to the public rhetoric of 
Kinnock and Day. Their rhetoric’s function pertains to certain acts and measures of gov-
ernance or the public sphere in the present or near future, not to the absolute and eternal 
interests of religious discourse. 
The methodology of cognitive poetics known as text world theory can provide in-
sights into linguistic modality and the modal worlds of knowledge, obligation, and hy-
pothesis on the part of the reader. This article will begin with a focus on text world theo-
ry’s examination of modal function which privileges context over a prescriptive linguistic 
function. This privileging of context situates the idea of linguistic modality as context-
conditional. In the examples of anaphora examined here, modality’s connection to possi-
bility and obligation typically construct and constrain the possible worlds addressed by 
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text world theory. In defining one such changed area, modality, one small step is taken 
toward outlining the processes of religious reading through cognitive poetics. 
 
 
2. Text World Theory: An Introduction 
Text world theory incorporates the experiential principles of cognitive linguistics. Its 
progenitor, Paul Werth, began building text world theory in the late 1980s until his death 
in 1995. The theory rests in an interest in “accounting for the cognitive processes behind 
the production and interpretation of all forms of human communication” (Gavins, Text 
World Theory 6). Since Werth’s death, text world theory’s methodology has been consist-
ently reevaluated, most recently in Joanna Gavins’ Text World Theory: An Introduction 
(2007), and the theory has been applied to texts as various as want ads, poetry, recipes, 
and many other forms of human communication.  
Like many other forms of cognitive linguistics, text world theory uses cognitive prin-
ciples to understand an ideal reader. Text world theory, however, is based in discourse, not 
text. Thus, text world theory is highly interested in how the context of a text’s produc-
tion contributes to both production and reception. Due to its ability to account for con-
text, text world theory has often been used in pragmatics, for example, in analyzing face-
to-face conversations. However, the theory has a history of describing the way that pos-
sible worlds’ logic, sometimes of a physical nature alternative to real physics, can be built 
by a reader. I suggest that this ability, text world theory’s ability to understand alternative 
logics, makes it a suitable candidate to investigate the supernatural foregrounding of the-
ological possibility. 
While a wholesale introduction to text world theory would be too timely and not re-
quired for the constraints of this article, I will discuss how the theory handles the “build-
ing” of representational models of possible worlds—the absorbing, qualifying, and con-
structing of supernatural possibilities. Such possibility leads directly into a discussion of 
modality’s specific functions in religious discourse. 
In Cognitive Poetics: An Introduction, Peter Stockwell reminds us that fictionality isn’t 
simply an aspect of literature; fictionality founds literature that is “religious, lyrical, auto-
biographical, political, [...] or that recounts real events” (92). Possible worlds are built 
through default semantics, propositions, and possibilities based upon our actual worlds. 
When evaluating the truth-value of an utterance, we compare it to our actual world. 
However, the actual world is just one of many possible worlds; in other worlds it is pos-
sible that Germany won World War Two or that there has been a World War Three 
where Earth has been invaded by Martians.  As Stockwell points out, “a very few sen-
tences are ‘obviously’ true; those which present analytic truths or universal assertions 
that are necessarily true by definition” (Cognitive Poetics 93). Sentences from possible 
worlds that do not correspond to our actual world can be true in their own possible 
world. In order for a statement to be true, it must be non-contradictory with the other 
statements building the possible world. For instance, it cannot be true in science fiction 
that Martians can build ray guns and Martians cannot build ray guns. Either they can, or they 
cannot. Likewise, in religious discourse, either Jesus can walk on water, or Jesus cannot.  
Limiting the logical possibilities helps build a possible world that does not correspond to 
our actual world but does share a consistency that we expect of our actual world. Any 
non-natural statements of a fictional possible world cannot break the rule of the excluded 
middle where a statement must be true or false (Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics 93). There is no 
middle ground where a statement can exist as both possibilities or neither.  
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As possible worlds are built by governing rules, propositions build into a state of ex-
istence an alternative logical possibility to the actual world. Yet possible worlds deal only 
with logic and have little to say of reading experience. Thus, they must be adapted to the 
discourse world, which involves both the text’s logical, possible world as well as the 
more dynamic cognitive interaction that a reader has with the text on the discourse level. 
Text world theory makes a distinction between the discourse world and the text 
world. In the discourse world, a reader can validate the statements of the text as either 
true or not true. On the text world level, a reader cannot evaluate the statements as true 
or untrue; the text world is only a constructed “mental representation”  (Gavins, Text 
World Theory 35). The best example of this arises from fiction and the untrustworthy nar-
rator. The untrustworthy narrator may provide facts meant to mislead the reader. Here, 
the reader is not able to participate in the “fact-checking” that the fictional narrator may 
have access to—this lack of participation defines the text world. The reader can build a 
mental representation of the possible world. However, there are limits to the reader’s 
ability to understand all operations and events in that world. While the text world is al-
ways related to the discourse world, the text world may be constructed from a variety of 
communicational functions: to order, to inform, to argue, to question, to personally ex-
press, to deceive, etc. Thus, the text world and discourse world will align according to 
their communicational function and the writer’s purposes. 
For a discourse world to exist, both a speaker/text and a listener/reader must be pre-
sent. Thus, the discourse world is defined by the communicative situation, not the liter-
ary one. Narratives or textual statements that can be validated are part of the discourse 
world, which means that the discourse world is the mediating domain for reality as well 
as projected fictions. As Joanna Gavins points out, the differences between the text 
world and discourse world rest in ontological differences. Gavins states that 
 
[d]iscourse world entities are real people, belonging to the same domain of existence as we 
do. In face-to face communication, we are able to ask questions of other discourse-world 
entities, clarify information and negotiate the contents of our text-worlds openly. In the 
discourse-worlds of written communication, where we are unable to question and clarify 
directly, we nevertheless understand our co-participant to be a real person. (Text World 
Theory 76)  
 
Naturally, a reader or writer can question this real person if need be; they exist on the 
same ontological level: both are actual people and conscious beings, as opposed to a fic-
tional character who is not a cognizant being and who offers information which cannot 
be verified. A reader’s ability to question a text’s statements because the text was created 
by an actual person, or, opposedly, to be only an eavesdropper because the communi-
cant is a literary creation, defines text world theory’s division of ontological levels. The 
major distinction between text worlds and discourse worlds depends upon the ability to 
check information. Text worlds cannot be fact-checked with an actual person, but dis-
course always can.  
 
 
3. Religious Hermeneutics, Temporality, Cognitive Theology, and Text 
World Theory 
Religious hermeneutics, even if narrowed to the single tradition addressed in this article, 
Christian hermeneutics, is a vast enterprise spanning millennia and millions of scholarly 
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pages. If a well-developed hermeneutic tradition such as religious hermeneutics informs 
cognitive poetics, then connection between these two traditions must be limited to par-
ticular hermeneutic qualities that influence readers’ schema and mental models. My focus 
will be on the unique relationship between the past, present, and future of Christian 
hermeneutics and its commitment to salvation and an eternal Heaven, and I’ll explore 
this unique temporal system through the use of modality in text world theory. 
Christian theologian George Montague captures the essence of Christian temporality 
in the following, and in doing so he differentiates basic temporal schemas of ordinary 
cognition from those informed by Christian hermeneutics. Montague explains that 
 
Because of the covenant promise, conditional though it was, Israel was pointed to a fu-
ture. [...] Not only the institutions but the events of the past would be repeated on an even 
greater scale. [...] Primordial time is really a description of end-time. The ideal past, now 
lost, is a portrait of the ideal future. The oracles were true, the promises were available, but 
the kings did not live up to them. Result: They were transferred to the future. (17-18) 
 
Christian temporality is one where the present and future, as well as the past, are not 
separated. Religious figures such as Jesus and God exist as they always have in a timeless 
manner. Present events are not just reminders or portents of, but of the same essence of 
the past and present. Eric Auerbach concurs in his seminal Mimesis: The Representation of 
Reality in Western Literature. Auerbach also outlines the difference between secular and 
Christian ideas of temporality. Auerbach posits that 
 
an occurrence on earth signifies not only itself but at the same time another, which it pre-
dicts or confirms, without prejudice to the power of its concrete reality here and now. The 
connection between occurrences is not regarded as primarily a chronological or causal de-
velopment but as a oneness within the divine plan, of which all occurrences are parts and 
reflections. Their direct earthly connection is of secondary importance, and often their in-
terpretation can altogether dispense with any knowledge of it. (73) 
 
Auerbach captures the chronological or causal inference that is the basis of ordinary 
cognition, but not Christian hermeneutic temporality, and Auerbach separates the divine 
from the earthly as well. Taking Montague and Auerbach’s assertions together, practi-
tioners of cognitive poetics can develop a solid foundation to examine how religious 
texts build temporal relationships differently than secular texts. This difference in tem-
poral systems is a staple of Christian hermeneutics and has been written on extensively 
by numerous theologians, including George Montague (17-18) and Henri de Lubac (17-
19), and prominent literary theorists, including Eric Auerbach (73) and Frank Kermode 
(48). 
One linguistic location of temporality is modality. In systemic functional linguistics 
(SFL), M. A. K. Halliday has noted religious discourse’s ability to change linguistic func-
tion. Halliday labels such an occurrence systemic indeterminacy. The cause of this indetermi-
nate linguistic function is attributed to “emotional” discourses, and Halliday uses Biblical 
religious discourse to support his claims (173). I will detail Halliday’s examples later to 
demonstrate how SFL’s systemic indeterminacy can inform uses of cognitive poetics that 
explore not literary or expository reading, but religious reading and interpretation. For 
the moment, it is enough to notice that the eminent functional linguist of the age has 
noted the importance of the modal in religious discourse. 
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Before proceeding with an interpretation of text, I would like to discuss one major 
principle of cognitive research into religious belief, minimal counterintuition. Cognitive 
religious research has discovered that only one or two supernatural premises are fore-
grounded in any particular religious interpretation; the rest of the schematic objects and 
processes creating the interpretation (or “world”) default to ordinary cognitive schemas 
and real-world agent-environment relationships (Barrett 86-89). That is, religious inter-
pretation is built from a principle of minimum departure. Unusual phenomena are possible if 
foregrounded in cognition, but the limits of cognition produce a background that de-
faults to typical, natural activities and possibilities. Text world theory works from a simi-
lar principle of minimum departure, in which all possible worlds are built from default 
“real world” possibilities and cognitive schemas until a text provides other-than-actual 
possibilities. These alternative, supernatural possibilities appear in religious discourse, but 
have been studied previously mainly in literary genres or imaginary “dream” worlds 
(Stockwell, Cognitive Poetics 96; Semino, Language and World Creation 64; Ryan 181). This 
overlap of a shared principle of minimal departure in cognitive research on religious be-
lief and in text world theory supports a fusion of these two lines of research. Additional-
ly, because text world theory begins its methodology in possible worlds and, as I’ll intro-
duce in depth momentarily, spatial-temporal location (Gavins, Text World Theory 36), it is 
a perfect match for measuring the differing temporal systems of religious and public dis-
courses and their attendant cognitive processes. 
 
 
4. Text World Theory and Community Reading Practices 
Text world theorists have long noted the ability of a reader to integrate unusual or idio-
syncratic phenomena and information, and this would include religious belief and expe-
rience that do not correspond to real-world possibilities. Gavins notes that discourse 
worlds are generally agreed upon, but “personal baggage” such as memory, motivation, 
intention, and experience can alter the negotiation of the discourse and text world 
(“Snow White” 130). Catherine Emmott links previous knowledge and experience to 
reader choice in negotiating meaning in a text. Emmott states that 
 
[b]asic level perceptual schemata play a role in the creation and tracking of these “text-
derived” knowledge stores and in their utilization in inference-making. The role of the 
reader lies in managing these different sources of information and in determining when to 
draw on them in the process of reading. [...] Whether inferences are made is likely to de-
pend on how central the events are to the action. (177, 179) 
 
Naturally, the different sources of meaning are attributable to experience as a member 
of a discourse community, and readers can “manage” their interpretation through the 
knowledge they allow into the reading process. Events and actions can be given symbolic 
meaning and a mental representation can be built according to any discourse community 
of which the reader is part.  
A discourse community’s peculiarity and idiosyncrasy can be accounted for in text 
world theory. Elena Semino has argued that “text worlds can be described on the basis 
of the kinds of impossible elements they contain” (Language and World Creation 61). The 
rhetorical, typological and hermeneutic practices of a discourse community are, to some 
degree, derived through the repetition of such practices—the repetition of certain “im-
possible elements” which mark or define the discourse community. On the level of the 
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individual reader, adopting the reading position based in community beliefs and practices 
delineates certain textual features as a trigger for these new “possible worlds” with their 
own rich cognitive schemas. H. G. Widdowson has argued similarly, saying “a different 
existential order” (qtd. in Semino, Language and World Creation 8) corresponding to the 
possible, not the actual or physical, can be enacted because of a text.  
Manfred Jahn’s work in cognitive narratology and imagination connects the internal 
act of reading with the external act of reproducing the codes and narratives of one’s dis-
course community. Jahn stipulates that a process of internalization takes place when a nar-
rative is realized as a mental representation. However, the logical counterpart of this pro-
cess is a process of externalization. According to Jahn, such externalization is aided by im-
agination. Jahn associates imagination with a number of routines that allow for the re-
production and rehearsal of the mental representations from interiorization. Jahn sug-
gests drafting a story for possible actual production as well as remembering, daydream-
ing, and similar mental activities as two forms of externalization (201-02). This process is 
cyclical (200) and links reception and production (203). Thus, an ideology rests in a read-
er even whether they are in the act of telling or reading. I find this particularly important 
when distinguishing literary reading practices from religious reading practices. Cognitive 
poetics has focused on literary reading, but Jahn’s theory more adequately captures how 
a religious reader can produce texts bearing the influence and ideology of religion. This 
emphasis on production is not seen in cognitive poetic analyses which emphasize literary 
reading practices, which are not a primary discourse to anyone; therein, this emphasis on 
production focuses on the self as “living” from or “constructed by” an ideological posi-
tion and primary discourse community that is interested in universals, not circumstantial 
problem-solving, as with political problems and debates.  
This differentiates my work from that of work similar to Michael Burke’s work on lit-
erary parable, where Burke does not infuse his work with the hermeneutics of Christiani-
ty when discussing Biblical parable. Burke treats Biblical parable as didactic, but states 
that “[w]e should be careful here not just to term religious stories as parables, since fa-
bles and allegories also fall into this category. The common link here is the projection of 
stories [...]” (116). Burke’s concern is not with religion, but with genres (literary or oth-
erwise) that parabolically project by actual world standards. However, the hermeneutics 
of Christian temporality differs from those of literature. The field of cognitive poetics 
must be careful not to mistake a potential contextual factor of religious hermeneutics—
Christian temporality—as something not potentially related to the deixis of reading. As 
Richard Coe argues, 
 
[r]hetorical structures [generate appropriate information and] are in this sense the social 
memory of standard responses to particular types of rhetorical situations and subject mat-
ter. [...] Those who fail to recognize forms, perhaps because they are from another culture 
or subculture, not part of the community, often misinterpret function, hence meaning. 
(268-69) 
 
Because reading a religious text as part of a religious discourse community also gener-
ates appropriate information in the form of the community’s hermeneutics, outsiders to 
a hermeneutical community may misunderstand the hermeneutical cues and dynamics of 
text; the religious authority extant in the hermeneutics and reading purpose of Scripture 
or Doctrine is part of rhetorical structure and situation, but only for the members of the 
religious community. As Peter Stockwell has suggested, our hermeneutics define our po-
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etics (“Literary Theory” 149), and this is certainly true of a religious hermeneutic sche-
mas expressed through cognitive poetics.  
When text world theory involves particular religious hermeneutics in its text world 
considerations, then religious hermeneutics and the cognitive assumptions they create 
inform text world theory: the actual world and ordinary cognition are the basis for all 
possible worlds, but supernatural elements marked as conceptually different and given a 
truth-value through absolutist religious logic are absorbed into the processes and proce-
dures of cognition and interpretation. 
 
 
5. World-building and Function-advancing Language 
Text world theory, as with all cognitive poetics, uses bodily experience as the reference 
point for the frames of knowledge accreted through everyday experience. The emphasis 
on the body means that our basic interpretative processes begin with time and space. 
Thus, deixis, the term for the study of such relations, is the salient feature with a starting 
point labeled the origo, the “I,” the notion of self, the zero-point of subjectivity that is the 
basic reference point for constructing a mental representation of a text. These deictic el-
ements surrounding or pointing to the self are known as world-building elements. World-
building elements can be seen as marking the spatial boundaries of the mental represen-
tation of the text world and include locatives, spatial adverbs, demonstratives and verbs 
of motion (Gavins, Text World Theory 36). For example, the following ideas are all per-
ceived in relation to the origo. 
 
locatives:      on the roof, down the road, upstairs 
spatial adverbs:    far afield, here, there 
demonstratives:   these, that, those 
verbs of motion:   went, came, ambled into 
 
Time and space are not the only deictic markers, however. Pronouns and other refer-
ents are also part of deixis and are objects that help to construct mental representations 
and “build” a world in the listener or reader’s mind. For example, a sentence such as I 
rode a bike nominates certain objects as present and important in the ongoing context of 
communication, and a sentence such as I was yelled at suggests a social relationship based 
on hierarchy with a self that was yelled at and an unknown actor that did the yelling. 
To help define the world-building process, text world theory borrows from Systemic 
Functional Linguistics to help define specific types of world-building. There are three 
basic types of relational processes in text world theory.  
 
intensive processes:   x is a y 
possessive processes:  x has a y 
circumstantial processes: x is on/at/with a y 
 
Each of these processes can occur in one of two modes, attributive and identifying, 
respectively. The attributive mode labels one element of the sentence as an attribute of 
another. 
 
attribute mode:    The stadium was full.  
        The stadium (carrier) was full (attribute). 
Anaphora, Possible Worlds, and Temporal Schemas 
Liberty Lee Kohn 
 
Enthymema, VIII 2013, p. 200 
http://riviste.unimi.it/index.php/enthymema 
 
The identifying mode has one element of the text world identifying another element: 
 
identifying mode:   This is a good thing. 
        This (identified) is a good thing (identifier). 
 
The above sentences are both intensive because x is a y, and they are intensive attrib-
utive and intensive identifying, respectively. 
A less relational aspect of world-building is simply the labeling of time, location, ob-
jects, and enactors. For example, time can be the distant past, the recent present, the 
immediate future, and other time frames. Location can be derived from any possible lo-
cation in any possible world. Objects are any references added to the world. Enactors are 
text-world entities that guide the reader and may exist in the discourse-world as well, but 
enactors are functionaries of the various conceptual levels of discourse and may change 
in different versions as a text’s purpose and ontological level (text-world versus dis-
course-world) change. 
Function-advancing propositions are typically the foregrounded actions that propel a 
discourse forward. These propositions contain an actor and action. Thus, they are dy-
namic and usually convey a change of state, as opposed to world-building elements, 
which simply populate (exist) and convey the limits or borders of a text world. Function-
advancing propositions also borrow from Systemic Functional Linguistics and evaluate 
propositions as material event processes. These material event processes often contain a 
goal in addition to an actor, although they need not contain a goal. Likewise, a specific 
actor may not be identifiable. Thus, they can be labeled as intention processes and 
supervention processes. Intention processes contain an actor, as in the following: 
 
intention process:   Mike broke the window. 
         Mike (actor) broke the window (goal=window). 
         Mike ran. 
 
In a sentence such as Mike ran, no goal is included, although a goal may exist later in 
the text, such as to get to another location. While this is not discernable through this sen-
tence-level analysis, text world theory’s interest in context can account for such long-
term goals. 
Opposed to intention processes, supervention processes do not have any “deliberate-
ness” behind them. 
 
supervention process:  The building crumbled.  
         The airplane blew up in midflight. 
         Mike died. 
 
Supervention processes have nothing deliberate or intentional in their action and/or 
change of state. A sentence such as Mike stumbled is also a supervention process be-
cause Mike most likely did not intend to stumble.  
During this article’s analysis of three text types ranging from the political to the reli-
gious, world-building elements will be an important indicator of a text type’s purpose 
and an identifying feature of how it projects its world for different instructive purposes. 
Likewise, function-advancing propositions will be an important feature as notions of 
agency and goals also help identify differences in text type. 
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6. Three Modal Worlds 
In relation to world-building elements and function-advancing propositions, I would like 
to introduce three types of possible worlds because of their relationship to a) textual and 
discourse knowledge and b) hypotheticality, which are the two major discriminating cri-
teria for differences in the political, public, and religious rhetoric analyzed here. 
In general, modal auxiliary verbs and modal worlds denote the speaker’s attitude to-
ward the subject matter. These modal worlds are related directly to linguistic modals ex-
pressing speaker knowledge, obligation, and possibility.  
Epistemic worlds represent how much a participant can evaluate a text’s reliability and 
often address the “gap” between text worlds and discourse worlds—that is, the ability to 
fact check. Linguistically, they are related to statements such as The sun will come up tomor-
row or I can arrive on time, statements that certify to varying degrees the reliability of vari-
ous happenings in the world. 
Deontic worlds express degrees of permission, obligation, duty, and requirement on the 
part of receiver. Gavins uses a vehicular instructional manual as an example (Text World 
Theory 99) of possible worlds where the reader is driving a Volkswagen and where the 
reader/driver should or should not perform certain driving actions. 
Deontic modality is often expressed through auxiliary verbs, as in phrases such as You 
may be excused from the table early (permission), You should attend your grandmother’s ninetieth 
birthday party (obligation), or You must report for military duty on the first of next month (obliga-
tion). As can be seen from these examples, the degree of permission and obligation are 
not simple and are relative to the context, the event, and the social deixis—the dynamics 
of the relationship between the sender, receiver, and action.  
Boulomaic worlds express hypothetical-ness and desire. Thus, they are future-oriented 
and/or imagined, and they are linguistically related to modals such as hope, wish, and desire 
and modal adverbs such as hopefully, regrettably, and others expressing a hypothetical world 
in the past or future. Boulomaic worlds’ major feature is a separately constructed modal 
world distinct from the current, original text world. Examples of boulomaic worlds can 
also start with if, as in If I leave the refrigerator open, the pears will mold. These boulomaic 
worlds are often not realized at the time of their creation (Gavins, Text World Theory 94), 
whether embedded as a subworld in a lengthier text or whether functioning as a world of 
their own, as is the case in the anaphora examined later in this article. 
 
 
7. Modal Worlds and Systemic Indeterminacy 
If boulomaic worlds are mainly a future-oriented world (as well as potentially an alterna-
tive world that is no longer attainable once desired in the past, as with regret), and deontic 
worlds can also be future-oriented, then each would seem to be an operative function in 
religious discourse. Religious discourse is highly instructive in nature and therefore cre-
ates both a desired world for the religious reader and a world which the reader is com-
manded to adopt by God the divine authority as instructor. This overlap of the 
boulomaic with the deontic is not unique to religious discourse; however, religious dis-
course is unique in that the two are consistently present in religious reading experience, 
whereas in the upcoming examination of a political speech by Neil Kinnock, the speech’s 
modal worlds are better delineated, as can be viewed by a switch from epistemic modali-
ty to deontic modality for rhetorical effect (Gavins, Text World Theory 121). Thus, the 
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context of political discourse would appear to affect modality less than religious dis-
course’s emotional context affects linguistic modality. 
Religious discourse’s ability to change the function of modal verb auxiliaries has been 
noted by M. A. K. Halliday. Halliday, working in systemic functional linguistics, titles 
such a break down in linguistic function systemic indeterminacy. The semiotic system over-
rides any determinate linguistic regularity in function. Halliday himself uses a passage 
from Genesis to prove his point. The underlining and bold print are Halliday’s emphasis. 
 
Now Noah was a good man and this pleased God. But all around him, Noah’s neighbors 
were lying and fighting and cheating and stealing. This made God sad. ... In time the earth 
was filled with people once again. And God was happy. (as qtd by Halliday 173) 
 
Halliday says of systemic indeterminacy that  
 
the world of our experience is highly indeterminate; and this is precisely how the grammar 
construes it in the system of process type [...]. Thus, one and the same text may offer al-
ternative models of what appear to be the same domain of experience, construing for ex-
ample the domain of emotion both as a process in a “mental” clause (this pleased God; cf. 
also God liked this) and as a participant in a “relational” one (this made God sad; God was 
sad). [...] There are a number of experiential domains, such as emotion, that are given such 
a multifaceted interpretation by the grammar of transitivity. Such domains are experiential-
ly difficult to come to terms with, and the grammar solves the problem by offering com-
plementary models for construing them. (173)  
 
The religious reading process is undoubtedly one of these “experientially difficult” 
domains where the boulomaic and deontic worlds overlap in what undoubtedly qualifies, 
by Halliday’s example, as an emotional context surrounding the religious reading process. 
Similarly, cognitive narratologist David Herman has noted of the cognitive paradigm that 
“linguistic system phonology, morphology, syntax, and pragmatic itself does not exist 
except as instantiated in the (minds of the members of the) speech community that uses 
the language” (9). Thus, a discourse community and its semiotics instantiate the func-
tionality and determinacy of language by their semiotics’ own standards. This is certainly 
true when a member of a religious community reads by that community’s standards. 
Moving from Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics to text world theory’s re-
search on indeterminacy, Paul Werth has noted that hypothetical modal worlds compli-
cate linguistic functionality and systemic determinacy. In his research into the various us-
es of the modal would, Werth suggests that traditional labels of habitual past and condi-
tional future do not use only would, as would be expected in systemic determinacy of 
would’s linguistic function. Moreover, Werth finds that modal “labels can only be coher-
ent in the context of a coherent model of temporal, psychological, and locational prox-
imity” (87). Werth’s pronouncement again places modality as determinate upon local, 
contextual, and psychological conditions, reminding us of both a discourse community’s 
peculiar hermeneutics and text world theory’s ability to address such peculiarities. 
Werth’s work also addresses one relevant aspect of epistemic modal worlds in reli-
gious reading. Werth suggests that the modals know and believe express degrees of speaker 
conviction of so-called fact (101), and Werth gives the following examples. The first is of 
religious conviction. The second is vernacular. 
 
I know my savior liveth. 
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I don’t believe we’ve met. 
 
Werth points out that the first example involves the unverifiable, but suggests convic-
tion, while the second example “is much more measured and ‘sensible’” (101-02). Noting 
that know and believe receive their determination from the agent’s willingness to “vouch 
for” the sentence’s subject or complement, Werth argues that the proposition is emo-
tional, not intellectual, with the above usage of believe (102). Thus, Werth’s explanation 
of systemic indeterminacy once again touches upon the emotional aspects of religious 
discourse, as did Halliday’s explanation.  
Werth concludes that interpretation for complements depends on the content of 
complement, the reliability of the speaker, and the availability of evidence (102). I would 
add that each of these is context- and situation-dependent as well. Werth’s work is im-
portant to this article’s upcoming analysis of anaphora for two reasons: first, he settles 
the notion of epistemic worlds in religious reading; the religious reading process, because 
it is instructive, has a high degree of epistemic knowledge. In short, for religious readers, 
God does not lie when giving instruction, and those readers know this when reading the 
Bible. To believe is to know, as Werth demonstrates above. Thus, if religious reading is 
taken as instructive, it is also taken as highly epistemic. No gap exists between the text 
world and discourse world, unless the reader chooses to discredit the absolutist advice of 
God on their own secular moral grounds—but this means the reader has exited the dis-
course community of belief. Second, Werth affirms Halliday’s modal systemic indeter-
minacy through text world theory, with each researcher attributing the indeterminacy’s 
cause to emotion and religion. 
 
 
8. Text Worlds and Public Rhetoric: Both Religious and Political 
The upcoming sections will examine the three discourse types to gain further insight into 
religious language and systemic indeterminacy, to further a discussion of world building 
and modality in political anaphora begun by Joanna Gavins, and to evaluate what aspects 
of religious language and systemic indeterminacy may disappear when religious language 
is used for public (political, secular, persuasive, activist) purposes. All of these discus-
sions help outline how a religious literacy contains its own unique forms of modality sys-
temically different than functional linguistic work.  
I will compare and contrast the three texts by the following criteria: first, the types of 
modal worlds extant in and expected of each text type based on its rhetorical function; 
second, the world-building elements, function-advancing propositions, historical-
situatedness, and historical concerns of each text’s rhetorical urgency according to rhe-
torical purpose; third, I’ll draw conclusions about how rhetorical function involves what 
Halliday defined as “emotion,” which makes systems indeterminate, with emotion affect-
ing modality and therefore creating the text’s systemic determinacy and indeterminacy. 
The overall purpose will be to illuminate aspects of religious discourse through compari-
son with political rhetoric and Catholic social activist rhetoric. I must also briefly clarify 
my definition of anaphora, which means something different to linguists and rhetori-
cians. My definition of anaphora does not deal with reference and antecedence on the 
linguistic level; rather, anaphora is a rhetorical figure using repetition of a word, clause, 
or phrase at or near the beginning or end of successive statements or sentences. 
The first example of anaphora is a 1983 political speech given by Labour Party par-
liamentarian Neil Kinnock. The speech has been examined in detail as an example of an-
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aphoric variatio by Joanna Gavins, and I’ll draw upon the relevant parts of her analysis to 
ground political anaphora’s linguistic and rhetorical premises. For a full analysis of the 
following speech, see Gavins’ Text World Theory, pages 118-123. Here is Kinnock’s fa-
mous political speech in its entirety: 
 
If Margaret Thatcher is re-elected as Prime minister, I warn you. 
I warn you that you will have pain—when healing and relief depend on payment. 
I warn you that you will have ignorance—when talents are untended and wits are wast-
ed, when learning is a privilege and not a right. 
I warn you that you will have poverty—when pensions slip and benefits are whittled 
away by a Government that won’t pay in an economy that can’t pay. 
I warn you that you will be cold—when fuel charges are used as a tax system that the 
rich don’t notice and the poor can’t afford. 
I warn you that you must not expect work—when many cannot spend, more will not 
be able to earn. When they don’t earn, they don’t spend. When they don’t spend, work 
dies. 
I warn you not to go into the streets alone after dark or into the streets in large crowds 
of protest in the light. 
I warn you that you will be quiet—when the curfew of fear and the gibbet of unem-
ployment make you obedient. 
I warn you that you will have defence of a sort—with a risk and at a price that passes 
all understanding. 
I warn you that you will be home-bound—when fares and transport bills kill leisure 
and lock you up. 
I warn you that you will borrow less—when credit, loans, mortgages and easy pay-
ments are refused to people on your melting income. 
If Margaret Thatcher wins, she will become more a Leader than a Prime Minister. That 
power produces arrogance and when it is toughened with Tebbitry and flattened and 
fawned upon by spineless sycophants, the boot-licking Knights of Fleet Street and place-
men in Quangos, the arrogance corrupts absolutely. 
If Margaret Thatcher wins—I warn you not to be ordinary. 
I warn you not to be young. 
I warn you not to fall ill. 
I warn you not to get old. (Kinnock qtd. in Gavins 118-119) 
 
In her analysis, Gavins notes the hypothetical nature of Kinnock’s future Britain is 
found at both the linguistic and conceptual level (118). She describes Kinnock’s speech 
based in anaphoric figures as “a single hypothetical situation [that includes] a great deal 
of world-building and function-advancing detail” (119). I will treat other examples of 
anaphora in this article by similar means, that of one possible world of incremental de-
tail—as opposed to individual worlds comprised of one prose line that contain very few 
world-building elements.  
Of large importance is Gavins’ analysis of conditionality in anaphora. (Conditionality is 
a linguistic-level form of hypothetical modal worlds.) In traditional rhetoric, conditionals 
in the anaphoric form of variatio are separated into two components: the protasis and the 
apodosis. The protasis is the hypothetical situation that sets up an alternative reality, and 
the apodosis foretells the consequences of the world hypothesized in the protasis. How-
ever, the protasis and apodosis needn’t appear in a specific order. Kinnock’s speech 
above inverts the chronological consequence by sometimes giving the consequence first, 
as when warning that when fuel charges are used as a tax system, one will be cold. The 
conditionality is of great consequence because of the highly built world with specific in-
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formation and a historical context as well. The attacks on Thatcherism’s social and eco-
nomic agenda are very specific. The apodosi such as “I warn you that you will be quiet. 
[...] you will have defence of a sort. [...] you will be home-bound” and others are them-
selves not highly built and could be easily consequent of and projected onto multiple sit-
uations where one will be quiet or homebound. However, the “I warn you” protasi of 
these lines contain many objects that are limited to the economic and governmental poli-
cy worlds. Items such as “pensions,” “benefits,” “unemployment,” “fares,” “transport 
bills,” “credits,” “loans,” “mortgages,” and the “bootlicking Knights of Fleet Street” are 
ideas, objects, people, and a place that limit the application of the “I warn you” protasi. 
As we shall see, the highly built world of political anaphora is one major difference from 
the religious world built in The Sermon on the Mount. I suggest this increase in political 
world-building is due to the historical urgency and situatedness of political speeches, and 
an intentional dearth in world-building in religious instruction exists because texts are of-
ten metaphorical or vague for easier application and projection onto a multitude of past, 
present, and future historical moments of moral crises. 
The second major difference, and one that impinges upon systemic determinacy and 
indeterminacy, lies in political rhetoric’s purpose. Political rhetoric is persuasive (human-
measured, arguable, non-absolute) and therefore does not rely on any absolute authority 
such as the authority of God or the supernatural. Persuasive discourse’s degree of deon-
tic obligation is lower than that of religious discourse taken as authored by the supernat-
ural. For example, Paul Chilton’s work in political discourse discusses intention and ca-
pability as primary factors in pragmatic and psychological credibility (32), and Leda 
Cosmides and John Tooby have similarly identified source-tagging as an important evo-
lutionary psychological adaptation for the identification of trustworthy information in 
uncertain environments (70). Thus, politics and its sources are of a different ilk than reli-
gious discourse. 
To build a case for world building in political discourse, Gavins suggests that Kin-
nock’s speech begins with function-advancing propositions that expand the epistemic 
world through possessive relational processes—i.e., having problems in the hypothetical 
Thatcher dystopia. As the speech continues, however, the possessive relational processes 
give way to intensive relational processes such as being cold and being quiet. Gavins ar-
gues that this changes the epistemic mode of the speech to “equally strong expressions 
of obligation” (121)—the deontic mode. Upon examination of the Sermon on the 
Mount, Kinnock’s own modal world-switch is discernable because Kinnock is bound to 
a greater extent to systemic determinacy. That is, the haves denote epistemic modality 
while the bes denote deontic obligation. Thus, political speech, because of its persuasive 
purpose, does not combine simultaneously the deontic and boulomaic, as religious dis-
course can because of its intentionally instructive purpose and authoritarian authorship.  
However, I do not want to draw too large of a conclusion about political speech and 
modality. Gavins notes that in Kinnock’s anti-Thatcherism speech, Kinnock’s personal 
belief seems powerful enough “to blur the boundary between epistemic and deontic mo-
dality” (121). I concur that political convictions can be highly deontic. However, they 
remain sophistic, historically-situated, and, for the most part, modally systemically de-
termined, as we see in Kinnock’s speech.  
In opposition, the religious discourse of Sermon on the Mount builds its world dif-
ferently, and its world building parallels the unique temporal system of Christian herme-
neutics.In Matthew 5 of the King James Bible, Jesus ascends a mountain and delivers his 
famous Sermon on the Mount. In 5.1 Jesus ascends the mount. I shall begin with Mat-
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thew 5.2. and end with 5.12. The italics are those of the King James text and not my 
own. 
 
And he opened his mouth, and taught them, saying, 
Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven. 
Blessed are they that mourn: for they shall be comforted. 
Blessed are the meek: for they shall inherit the earth. 
Blessed are they which do hunger and thirst after righteousness: for they shall be filled. 
Blessed are the merciful: for they shall obtain mercy. 
Blessed are the pure in heart: for they shall see God. 
Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God. 
Blessed are they which are persecuted for righteousness’ sake: for theirs is the kingdom 
of heaven. 
Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and  shall say all manner 
of evil against you falsely, for my sake. 
Rejoice, and be exceedingly glad: for great is your reward in  heaven: for so perse-
cuted they the prophets which were before you. (Matthew 5.2-5.12) 
 
Rhetorically, the instructive nature of the text can be gleaned from 5.2’s “and taught 
them,” although this is not entirely different than Kinnock’s purpose. I suggest the third- 
person comment on Jesus’ purpose helps define the deontic modality of this passage, but 
the deontic modality is implicit because of the unquestionable nature of the Bible itself as 
absolute in its authority for people who are part of its religious community. 
To begin discussing the Sermon on the Mount, I would briefly point out the changes 
in pronoun usage from the third person to the second person (5.11-12). This slow 
change also redirects the early statements on the poor in spirit, the meek, etc. into in-
structional material for the reader to be poor in spirit, meek, etc. in order to garner the 
rewards of heaven. Thus, the world built is one where the reader must, by 5.11-12, real-
ize their own agentive self as a world-builder and is obligated to adopt the status of earli-
er propositions such as being poor in spirit, meek, merciful, a peacemaker, etc. to live by 
Jesus’ word.  
The linguistic choice of a relational process (“Blessed are”) to represent the hypothet-
ical is also a rhetorical choice with sustained linguistic indeterminacies. Although the syn-
tax is inverted, the anaphora of 5.3 through 5.11 are intensive relational processes. I offer 
5.3 through 5.5 as examples: 
 
The poor in spirit are blessed. 
They that mourn are blessed. 
The meek are blessed. 
 
This inverted syntax of intensive relational processes continues through 5.11. These 
statements are the protasi, the hypothetical condition that must be met for the conse-
quences of the apodosi to become true. However, if the protasi are hypothetical deontic 
worlds, then they exist as if or when worlds, and the label of intensive relational processes 
does not hold. Because of the deontic obligation to follow instruction, and also because 
of the boulomaic wish-world that constitutes entrance to heaven and other qualities of 
eternal salvation, the statements in a systemic functional linguistics would be as follows. 
 
If (or when) one is poor in spirit, then the kingdom of heaven is theirs. 
If (or when) one mourns, then one shall be comforted. 
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If (or when) one is meek, then one shall inherit the earth. 
 
This pattern continues through 5.10. Because of the mix of deontic obligation and 
boulomaic promises of heaven, we have a particular kind of systemic indeterminacy in 
the Sermon on the Mount. What appears to be an intensive relational process in the 
protasi (“Blessed are”) functions not as a relational process, but a deontic hypothetical 
condition one must achieve in order to receive the apodosi’s boulomaic world of heaven.  
Thus, we reach an important difference between political public and religious rheto-
ric, or, to be more particular, political and religious temporal systems. In this particular 
form of religious rhetoric oriented toward salvation and its temporality, the protasis is 
deontic and the apodosis is boulomaic: Note 5.3 through 5.11 of the Sermon on the 
Mount. In such a system, completing the obligation provides the wish-world. The deon-
tic protasis creates systemic indeterminacy by turning intensive relational processes, 
which are typically direct statements, into hypotheticals meant to create obligation. Jesus 
uses direct statements, yet their determinacy is hypothetical in function. The conditional 
construction known as variatio (protasis + apodosis), a form of anaphora, allows for the 
deontic and boulomaic relationship. While this form of anaphora is available for use in 
political rhetoric, the essentialist basis of religious interpretation changes the relationship 
between present and future, and modality functions differently. 
Note that the boulomaic apodosi often do contain the modal shall and therefore cre-
ate the future in predictable function. However, 5.3 and 5.10 render this boulomaic 
world in the present tense, not the future tense. This change in function, a form of sys-
temic indeterminacy, is due, much like the pronoun usage, to the anaphora’s ability to 
produce a future world because of the plethora of future tense shalls, forcing a reader to 
interpret the present tense “theirs is the kingdom of heaven” as a future-oriented 
boulomaic promise as well. In terms of the functional aspect of functional linguistics, in 
anaphora, frequency may produce indeterminacy in typical function. In the case of the 
religious rhetoric of the modal function of Sermon on the Mount, anaphora overrides 
typical modal function and produces (in 5.3 and 5.10) a future-oriented boulomaic mo-
dality through present-tense modals. 
Before ending discussion of this highly deontic discourse, I would like to point out 
the lack of world-building elements compared to the Kinnock speech, namely the eco-
nomic and political world-builders such as pensions, benefits, unemployment, fares, 
transport bills, credits, loans, and mortgages. As previously suggested, this is due to the 
lack of specific historical circumstances prompting the Sermon on the Mount. This 
sparsely-built world would be typical of instructive religious maxims and religious dis-
course in general, for highly built worlds are not easily mappable or congruent with other 
environments and contexts.  
In support of religious texts having sparsely-built worlds, Gavins has argued that 
world building is one feature indicative and important to genre identification (“Snow 
White” 134), and Burke states that there are two intertextual triggers in the reading pro-
cess. The first is linguistic foregrounding, and the second is the pragmatic realm, which 
Burke defines as having historical, contextual, or genre-based triggers (121). Purpose and 
genre dictate the quantity of objects and concepts in the possible world. Burke further 
notes that with such knowledge comes formal constraints upon the reading processes. In 
the case of the Sermon on the Mount, the religious purpose, constructed through a lack 
of world-builders, creates a genre that constrains reader’s expectations and interpretation 
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by triggering appropriate religious schemas and intentions. Similarly, it avoids the politi-
cal by lacking the specificity of Kinnock’s political speech. 
To continue this discussion of a lack of world-building elements in The Sermon on 
the Mount, the under-built world in the Sermon on the Mount seems to offer a paucity 
of certain types of historical and contextual information that differentiates the biblical, 
instructive anaphora from the political warnings of Kinnock’s speech. Gavins has noted 
that in literary narratives 
 
actions and events often take prominence once the initial deictic boundaries of the text-
world are established. In such cases, the function of these elements is to propel the narra-
tive forwards. The function-advancing elements of an instructive text, on the other hand, 
are likely to feature a greater number of imperatives, and so on. (“(Re)thinking Modality” 
81)  
 
Kinnock’s speech is derived from an epistemic modality that is highly literary because 
of the “gap” between the discourse world and text world. That is to say, his discourse is 
not absolute, but persuasive. Not all his facts can be checked. Unlike religious discourse, 
not all of Kinnock’s dystopian hypotheticals are destined to become truths, and a reader 
or audience activates a hypothetical schema to evaluate these claims. The political, dys-
topian, and therefore “fictional” nature of Kinnock’s speech requires more world-
building, as Gavins ascertains of literary narratives in general. The reader’s procedural 
knowledge is low, and the hypothetical possible world must be built before being capable 
of instruction and persuasion through fear and warnings. The Sermon on the Mount 
contains a greater number of function advancing imperatives, as Gavins suggests of in-
structive texts, because Jesus’ absolute credibility allows him to obligate his discourse 
community in underbuilt hypothetical worlds. These future-oriented religious possibili-
ties of admission to heaven do not have to be highly built because of a reader’s proce-
dural and previous knowledge, which are dependent upon the well-known and absolute 
(not potential) existence of Heaven, at least to the religious believer. 
Returning to Christian hermeneutics, I would suggest that the Christian temporality 
must be included in a discussion of the Sermon on the Mount as well. The boulomaic 
world needn’t be a distant or future-oriented world; rather, it can be enacted on a daily 
basis, as the theologian Montague explains. Thus, one can read the Sermon on the 
Mount’s apodosi’s future-oriented modals as worlds that happen simultaneously when 
one achieves the deontic world in the present. In this sense, the boulomaic is always po-
tentially present. Thus, we see that Christian hermeneutics offers yet another form of 
systemic indeterminacy—one where the wish-world is not distant, separate, or alternative 
to one’s lived reality, but enacted through religious experience and cognition on a per-
petual basis. If, as theologian George Montague clarifies, there is no “here and there” 
(23) in the Christian religious reader’s idea of heaven and earth (as opposed to the Pla-
tonic separation of a non-material and material realm), then the boulomaic world can ex-
ist in the here and now in a heaven-on-earth scenario. Thus, the idea of the boulomaic as 
a future-world marked by a set of linguistically determinant functions (future modals, for 
example) is compromised, and the systemic function of boulomaic modals can become 
indeterminant, existing in both future-oriented and present-oriented modals, as when one 
theoretically inherits the earth in the present moment, not the distant future. 
I would now like to transition to public writings of the Catholic faith. Started in the 
United States of America in 1933 as a response to the Catholic church’s perceived social 
inactivity during the Great Depression, Dorothy Day’s The Catholic Worker was a grass 
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roots paper combining religious purpose with sociopolitical purpose. Day and her co-
conspirators wished to address the same social problems of the decade as the socialists, 
but to address such problems without the communist’s ideological baggage of atheism. 
Returning to cognitive poetics, differentiating which aspects of Day’s public rhetoric 
resemble political worlds, such as in Kinnock’s speech, and which resemble the religious 
absolute worlds, as with the Sermon on the Mount, will provide a framework in which 
only religious discourse speaking of salvation or the eternal, not the earthly, produces 
systemic indeterminacy and the unique world building exemplified in the Sermon on the 
Mount. In doing so, I can outline when aspects of a religious schema falter due a move-
ment away in purpose or authority from religious reading purposes or religious experien-
tial purpose. I’ll begin by looking at small strands of anaphora in Day’s own writing. I’ll 
then include the closing of one non-anaphoric essay so as to provide a more in-depth 
answer to questions involving deontic and boulomaic modality. The following excerpt is 
taken from the first issue of The Catholic Worker, dated May 1933. In my following analy-
sis, I will continue to use italics when analyzing data from Day’s essay, rather than quota-
tions, to remain consistent with this article’s previous text world theory examples, as well 
as the conventions of text world theory in general. Also, I will be using bold print, as 
opposed to quotations, when emphasizing terms that share theoretical links. 
 
For those who are sitting on the park benches in the warm spring  sunlight. 
 For those who are huddling in shelters trying to escape the rain. 
 For those who are walking the streets in the all but futile search for work. 
 For those who think that there is no hope for the future, no recognition of their 
plight—this little paper is addressed. 
 It is printed to call their attention to the fact that the Catholic Church has a social pro-
gram—to let them know that there are men of God who are working not only for their 
spiritual, but for their material welfare. 
 It’s time there was a Catholic paper printed for the unemployed. 
 The fundamental aim of most radical sheets is the conversion of its readers to radical-
ism and atheism. 
 Is it not possible to be radical and not atheist? 
 Is it not possible to protest, to expose, to complain, to point out  abuses and demand 
reforms without desiring the overthrow of religion? (“To Our Readers” 1-2) 
 
The above anaphoric passage has a less emphatic purpose than Kinnock’s “I warn 
you” and the Sermon on the Mount’s religious obligation. Day writes to inform, to “call 
attention to” the church’s involvement in material and social matters. Thus, the purpose 
is already similar to that of Kinnock’s political speech. Day is not interested in matters of 
salvation or Christian temporality; rather, The Catholic Worker is sociopolitical in nature. 
In the first three anaphoric lines, we see no conditionality or hypothetical world. The 
world Day presents is the historically-situated world of the Great Depression. The enac-
tors of the first three lines—those who are sitting, huddling, and walking—portray nei-
ther the hypothetical worlds of the Sermon on the Mount’s salvation nor Kinnock’s dys-
topia. The function-advancing processes and circumstances create a text world resem-
bling the actual world of May 1933: 
 
are sitting (intention process) on park benches (goal) in the warm  spring sunlight (cir-
cumstance) 
are huddling (intention process) in shelters (circumstance) trying to escape the rain 
(goal) 
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are walking (intention process) the streets (goal) in the all but futile search for work 
(circumstance) 
 
In the fourth line, there is a change from physical movement (sitting, huddling, walk-
ing) to mental processes, For those who think [...]. This focus on mental material processes 
is constant in Day’s essay. Geoff Thompson suggests that mental material processes are 
about “undergoing [as opposed to acting] and involve at least one human participant: the 
participant who has the mind in which the process occurs” (92-93). Thus, Day’s rhetori-
cal strategy of mental processes—a one participant affair—confirms the lack of deontic 
modality, which would require a second, more forceful participant creating obligation, 
not one participant slowly persuaded through their own reflection. 
In the fifth line, which breaks from the anaphoric repetition, we see again the mental 
process in Day’s rhetorical strategy. Rather than commanding her communist reader to 
be theist and her Catholic reader to be socially-minded, Day foregoes the deontic mode 
and chooses instead mental material processes that suggest the reader’s potential growing 
inner awareness, as opposed to an awareness developed from an external source, from 
deontic obligation. This resembles the persuasive, source-tagged elements of public po-
litical rhetoric, not absolutist religious rhetoric. In the fourth line, we see the paper calling 
their attention. Although the paper is an actor “calling,” the emphasis on attention con-
tinues the mental process theme. This focus on the reader’s mental processes continues 
with Day’s phrase to let them know, also in line five. 
Thus far, Day’s rhetorical strategy foregoes both hypothetical worlds and deontic 
modality. In lines 8-9, the final two lines presented above, Day does build a hypothetical 
world where it is possible to be both radical and theist. Her statement Is it not possible to be 
radical and not atheist? allows for the communist to accept religion and the religious to be-
come socially active. Thus, the more indirect rhetorical strategy of mental processes has 
shifted to Day’s more direct creation of a boulomaic world of Catholic material interests. 
We see this through the brief anaphora of line nine, with its function-advancing proposi-
tions to protest, to expose, to complain, to point out, each of which suggests to the reader 
actional material intention processes in the boulomaic world, as opposed to the mental 
process of the reader “undergoing” an awareness in the actual world—Day’s earlier rhe-
torical strategy. Note that this rhetoric also skips any mention of salvation, heaven, or 
the world beyond; thus, this rhetoric does not repeat the rhetoric of the Sermon on the 
Mount, wherein present and future worlds, as well as their modal tenses, were collapsed 
into one and became systemically indeterminant or where action on earth is connected to 
action toward or the simultaneous existence of Heaven. 
To underscore Day’s rhetorical strategy in Catholic public discourse, I would like to 
include the final two paragraphs of an essay from the following issue of The Catholic 
Worker, dated June/July 1933. The essay is entitled “The Listener.” 
 
Although the Communists may not as yet be aware of it, they witnessed in Union Square 
on May Day the inception of a new struggle for social justice. A germ of more than mere 
passive interest was planted in the minds of many who either read The Catholic Worker or 
saw its headlines displayed.  
As soon as the worker realizes that the Church Militant is interested in man’s welfare 
as well as his soul, he will stop to consider before embracing Communism and its atheistic 
ideas. The Scriptures, history, tradition and common sense will tell him that without God 
there is neither happiness, security or prosperity, either in men or in nations. (2-3) 
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We again see in the above paragraphs an emphasis on mental processes—may not yet 
be aware of it; they witnessed; as soon as the worker realizes; he will stop to consider—I 
would even suggest that the metaphor planted in the minds also references the mental pro-
cess. Thus, Day’s rhetorical strategy is similar to her previous essay: The communist 
must come to an understanding of the church’s ability to address the material as well as 
the spiritual. Day suggests this new world of social justice already lives for the Catholic, 
but is an unrealized mental representation and epistemic world for the communist. The 
opening lines of each paragraph underscore that Catholic social interests are a reality to 
the Catholic, but not the communist: Although the Communists may not as yet be aware of it 
and As soon as the worker realizes each suggest that the epistemic world and mental repre-
sentation of the church as a social force for the social-minded Catholic is not yet a pos-
sible world for others such as the communist. 
Thus, one’s ideology constrains one’s mental representations and epistemic world. 
Laura Hidalgo-Downing notes that initial work on ideology appeared in Roger Fowler’s 
Literary Criticism. Hidalgo-Downing updates the research into ideology, stating that 
 
[a]s explained by Fowler, world views typically reproduce ideologies, in the sense that lan-
guage, as a tool for the classification and interpretation of reality, constructs “common 
sense” versions of how things are or should be in the world(s) we inhabit. This indirect re-
lation between human mind and reality, domains which are mediated by language, is 
stressed by recent cognitive approaches to the study of linguistic phenomena. (69) 
 
Material mental processes, then, are deployed rhetorically to underscore that differ-
ences in ideology inhibit the transition from a hypothetical boulomaic world to an actual 
world, but also that it is the material mental process that would allow the communist to 
remain radical but accept theism because of its social activism.  
However, this relationship between mental processes, ideology, and rhetoric most 
likely works by degrees, as modality and possibility do. The interpretations and compari-
sons of anaphora in public political, religious, and religious activist rhetoric I’ve offered 
here are only a start and require further investigation. Beyond these observations, I will 
only suggest that the web of relations will, as with all texts, be context and situation de-
pendent. 
Despite her religious impetus, Day’s admittedly material historical interests as well as 
her layperson status deny her the rhetorical usefulness of a high degree of deontic mo-
dality through religious absolutism, i.e., the word of God. Thus, social, political, and pub-
lic rhetoric may lose the authority of absolutism because of entrance into the social and 
political in the hands and mouth of a layperson. We do see a change to a higher degree 
of deontic modality in the final sentence of Day’s “The Listener,” where Day cites the 
authority of the Scriptures (as well as history, tradition, and common sense) and their ho-
ly authorship to “tell” the reader the obligation inherent in reality, rather than leave it to 
their mental processes to “realize” her purported truth. 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
Both Day and Kinnock have similar epistemic worlds because of the gap between the 
discourse world and the text world that exists in sophistic rhetoric that utilizes hypothet-
ical worlds. To build a hypothetical world without the epistemic guarantee of divine au-
thority places one’s audience in an epistemic dilemma. To argue convincingly with per-
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suasive force in public does not guarantee one’s future wish-world will become enacted, 
unlike religious discourse, where meeting such conditions guarantees one’s entrance into 
heaven. Such is the more distant relationship between discourse world and text world in 
public discourse, which marks the epistemic distance between political and religious uses 
of hypotheticality. 
However, the right to build hypothetical worlds of utopia or dystopia are not exclu-
sive to religious anaphora or discourse. While Day foregoes such rhetorical practices, 
Kinnock’s invention and arrangement depend upon hypothetical worlds. Yet Kinnock’s 
hypothetical worlds tend to resemble the epistemic worlds and world-building of fiction. 
Again, this is because of fictional and political discourses’ epistemic distance from reli-
gious epistemology. 
Moreover, it would appear that systemic indeterminacy is also an effect of more 
“emotional” or absolute religious discourses. Both Kinnock’s speech and Day’s essays 
are systemically determinant in function, despite containing the hypotheticality that sus-
tains systemic indeterminacy in the Sermon on the Mount. Determinacy may also be in-
fluenced in degree by purpose and the amount of historical situatedness extant in the 
purpose. The Sermon on the Mount, instructive and absolute, builds worlds sparse in 
object and concept, most likely to make it transhistorical and easily mappable onto many 
circumstances, activities, and eras.  
Lastly, a link exists between mental processes, ideology, and hypothetical boulomaic 
worlds. As seen in analysis of Day’s essays, mental processes allow a participant to come 
to an understanding of the boulomaic, therein hoping to persuade the public to action so 
that the boulomaic world becomes the actual world. In religious discourse such as the 
Sermon on the Mount, the boulomaic already exists and is available in the present, deon-
tic world. The boulomaic and deontic—the future and present—are one in the same in 
time and space, if one is a believer.  
These relationships between public and religious, as well as temporal separation or 
overlap, will vary according to text and context, but clearly cognitive poetics and reli-
gious hermeneutics share common ground and can mutually inform each other’s inter-
pretive theories. Specific interpretations such as the one provided by this article will be as 
essential as grand theories if the relationship between cognitive poetics and hermeneutics 
is to bloom.  
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